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Wages and the Bargaining Regime 
under Multi-level Bargaining: Belgium,
Denmark and Spain
ABSTRACT ■ We use a harmonized matched employer–employee dataset to
study the impact of the collective bargaining regime on wages in the
manufacturing sector in three countries with a multi-level system of bargaining:
Belgium, Denmark and Spain. Single-employer bargaining has a positive effect
both on wage levels and on wage dispersion in Belgium and in Denmark. 
In Spain, it also increases wage levels but reduces wage dispersion. Our
interpretation is that in Belgium and Denmark, single-employer bargaining is
used to adapt pay to the specific needs of the firm while, in Spain it is mainly
used by trade unions in order to compress the wage distribution.
KEYWORDS: collective bargaining ■ manufacturing industry ■ trade unions
■ wage structure
Introduction
Institutions are an important determinant of the shape of the wage struc-
ture. Research using cross-country comparisons shows that the more cen-
tralized and/or coordinated the wage setting system, the more compressed
is the wage distribution (Blau and Kahn, 2002; Teulings and Hartog, 1998;
Wallerstein, 1999). This is due to two factors. Within centralized countries,
multi-employer agreements set minimum wages that increase wages at the
bottom of the wage distribution. In addition, multi-employer bargaining
coordinates wage-setting, reducing inter-industry and inter-firm differen-
tials. Research into the wage-structure effect of different bargaining regimes
within countries where multi-employer bargaining is the prevalent bargain-
ing mode, which is the case in most Western European countries, is much
less extensive and produces more heterogeneous results. Under such set-
tings most workers, irrespective of their union status, are covered by a
nationwide and/or sectoral multi-employer agreement which sets minimum
wages for defined categories of workers. Wage bargaining may also occur at
the firm and/or establishment level, generally increasing wages above the
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national or industry standards. It is interesting to know the wage structure
effect of the different bargaining regimes under multi-level bargaining since
many actors, including the OECD (2004) and European Commission
(2004) favour giving more weight to single-employer bargaining in the
process of wage determination.
Previous studies have shown that single-employer bargaining increases
wage levels relative to multi-employer bargaining (Cardoso and Portugal,
2003; Dell’Aringa and Lucifora, 1994a; Hartog et al., 2002; Palenzuela and
Jimeno, 1996; Rycx, 2003). Findings concerning the effect of the bargaining
regime on the dispersion of wages are much more heterogeneous. Theor-
etically, the dispersion of wages is expected to be higher for workers covered
by single-employer agreements because they may increase inter-firm wage
differentials by taking into account firm-specific characteristics and local
economic conditions. This was observed in Sweden by Hibbs and Locking
(1996), who found that the sensitivity of wage changes to local market con-
ditions was significantly higher after the move from central to industry and
local bargaining in 1982, and that wage dispersion has been increasing since
then. For Belgium, Rycx (2003) found a lower dispersion of inter-industry
wage differentials for firms covered only by a multi-employer agreement,
compared to firms covered additionally by a single-employer agreement.
This suggests that rent-sharing or efficiency wage practices are more com-
mon when there is a firm-specific agreement and that it increases the dis-
persion of wages. For Portugal, Cardoso and Portugal (2003) conclude that
wage drift (ratio between actual and negotiated wages) works to overcome
the constraints imposed by multi-employer bargaining, allowing firms wider
flexibility in their wage policy.
Other studies, however, show the opposite. Dell’Aringa and Lucifora
(1994b) found that local wage bargaining significantly reduces wage disper-
sion across establishments in Italy. They interpreted this as a sign of a
greater desire for wage standardization among establishments covered by
such an agreement. Checchi and Pagani (2004) also found that, in Italy, local
bargaining reduces wage inequality.
Other researchers have focused on the effect of the bargaining regime on
wage dispersion within firms. According to Rodriguez-Gutiérez (2001) this
results from a bargaining process between the union and the employer, who
have opposite preferences. Trade unions are in favour of higher wage levels
and smaller dispersion, while employers prefer greater dispersion. This
preference is explained by Tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981)
which predicts that a more dispersed wage structure (resulting from
performance-related pay or increased inter-occupational differentials) may
provide incentives for workers to increase their effort. The fact that union-
ism reduces wage dispersion has been widely demonstrated empirically in
Anglo-Saxon countries (Freeman, 1980). For Italy, Dell’Aringa and
Lucifora (1994b) found that the within-firm wage dispersion decreases
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(2)
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significantly as union density rises. A similar result has been found by
Rodriguez-Gutiérez (2001) for firms covered by a company agreement 
in Spain. Overall, the final outcome of company bargaining on the within-
firm wage dispersion seems ambiguous: Dell’Aringa and Lucifora (1994b)
found no difference in within-firm wage dispersion between firms covered
only by a multi-employer agreement and those covered additionally by
a company agreement. Conversely, Dominguez and Rodriguez-Gutiérez
(2004) found that company bargaining reduces the within-firm wage disper-
sion in Spain. They attribute this result to the action of unions. Finally,
Dell’Aringa et al. (2004), studying the effect of the bargaining regime on
within-establishment wage inequality in Italy, Spain, Belgium and Ireland,
found greater within-establishment inequality for establishments covered by
a single-employer agreement. However, when a larger set of controls was
included, the association was inverted or became statistically insignificant.
To sum up, this literature review shows that, compared to multi-employer
bargaining, single-employer bargaining may increase or decrease wage dis-
persion, and this may happen through the modification of inter-firm wage
differentials and/or within-firm wage dispersion.
In this article we study the wage structure effect of different bargaining
regimes in the manufacturing sector in Belgium, Denmark and Spain.
Multi-employer bargaining predominates in all three countries, but the bar-
gaining structure and its history differ greatly between them. In Belgium
and Denmark, single-employer bargaining has greatly expanded since the
1980s on the initiative of employers and the government. In Spain, by con-
trast, the structure of collective bargaining is more inert and has not changed
very much since the Franco period, when company agreements were used
as a tool for worker mobilization and for political struggle. Moreover, in
Belgium and Denmark single-employer agreements always complement
multi-employer agreements, whereas in Spain the two are mutually exclu-
sive. Therefore, firms covered by a single-employer agreement in Spain
often display a high union presence, but this is not necessarily the case in
Belgium and Denmark. Previous studies show that wage dispersion is
smaller under single-employer agreements in Spain while the opposite
holds true for Belgium. This has never been studied in Denmark but it has
been in another Scandinavian country (Sweden), where the effects are found
to be similar to those in Belgium. Multi-country comparison is necessary to
determine whether this divergence in results is due to national differences
or to the use of different data and methodologies.
The first objective of this article is thus to provide reliable comparative
results. More precisely, we compare the wage dispersion (standard devi-
ation and inter-decile wage differentials) and the wage levels between
workers covered by a multi-employer agreement and workers covered
by a single-employer agreement. We use a unique harmonized multi-
country dataset, the European Structure of Earnings Survey of 1995,
Plasman et al.: Wages and the Bargaining Regime under Multi-level Bargaining
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which contains detailed information about wages, workers’ and employ-
ers’ characteristics and the level(s) of the collective agreements covering
each firm. Although matched employer–employee datasets are now avail-
able for a number of individual countries, to the best of our knowledge
the ESES is the only multi-country dataset with matched employer–-
employee data. Our results confirm previous findings that, compared to
multi-employer bargaining, single-employer bargaining has a positive
effect both on wage levels and on wage dispersion in Belgium and in
Denmark; while in Spain, single-employer bargaining also increases wage
levels but reduces wage dispersion. Our interpretation is that single-
employer agreements are mainly used in Denmark and Belgium to adapt
pay to the specificities of the firm and to local economic conditions. In
Spain, they are mainly used by unions to raise wages and to compress the
wage distribution.
Institutional Framework
Multi-employer bargaining is the dominant bargaining regime in all three
countries, but they differ in many other aspects. This section provides a
short description of the collective bargaining system in each country. We
also link the arguments presented in the previous section to each country’s
institutional characteristics, in order to derive some expectations about
empirical results.
In Belgium and Denmark, collective bargaining occurs at three levels in a
hierarchical manner, such that an agreement at one level cannot be less
favourable than higher-level agreements. Inter-sectoral agreements cover
the whole country. They set national minimum wages and a margin for wage
increases, and define the framework for the lower bargaining levels. Sectoral
agreements set industry standards (minimum wages by category of worker)
for most of the employees in the industry concerned. Finally, wages may be
increased at the level of the firm or establishment by a single-employer
agreement. The importance of each level in the wage-setting process has
varied over time. Until the 1980s, wages were mainly determined by sect-
oral agreements. In the late 1960s, single-employer bargaining expanded,
mainly because shop-floor unions sought pay increases in excess of higher-
level standard rates (Traxler et al., 2001). The economic crisis that followed
the two oil shocks led employers in many countries to call for more flexible
working conditions, leading to a second wave of bargaining decentraliza-
tion in the mid-1980s with company-level determination of working time.
A third wave in the 1990s was initiated by employers in order to tailor
wages more strictly to the performance of the individual firm (Traxler et al.,
2001). Because Belgium and Denmark are both small, open economies, they
were severely hit by the economic crisis.
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In Denmark, there was a shift in many industry agreements from the
standard rate system, where the sectoral agreement prescribes the wages
actually earned, to the minimum pay system, where actual pay may well
be higher. Between 1989 and 1995, the proportion of workers covered by
the minimum pay system rose from 30 to 61 percent (Andersen, 2003).
Pay increases at company level take often the form of a ‘pay-sum bar-
gaining’: the aggregate size of the pay increase is determined by collective
bargaining but its allocation is left to management (Traxler et al., 2001).
In addition, the cost-of-living indexation mechanism was abolished in
1982, which reduced aggregate wage increases.
In Belgium, pay determination has also shifted from industry to single-
employer level. An explosion in company agreements took place between
1980 and 1985, the number rising from 341 to 3253. It declined after this
period and stabilized around 2000 in the 1990s (Van Ruysseveldt and
Visser, 1996). In order to preserve the competitiveness of Belgian firms,
the government froze private-sector wages for the periods 1981–2. Wage
increases above inflation were forbidden from 1983 to 1986. From 1984 to
1986, the cost-of-living indexation procedure was altered so that the first
two percent each year was not compensated by a wage increase but
instead used to supplement the social security fund. Finally, a new wage
freeze was imposed in 1995–6, followed by a law on competitiveness
imposing a ceiling for wage increases based on those in France, Germany
and the Netherlands. The automatic link between prices and wages stayed
in place, although the system changed in order to reduce aggregate wage
increases (by excluding products like fuel, tobacco and alcohol from the
price index).
Because single-employer agreements cannot set wages below national
and industry standards, wage levels should on average, in both countries, be
higher when a company agreement supplements the multi-employer agree-
ment. We also expect inter-firm wage differentials to be higher for firms
covered by a single-employer agreement because they can take into account
firm-specific characteristics (size, profit, region) that are generally not
among the criteria that define industry and national standards (those criteria
are principally age, experience and occupation). Finally, the presence of a
company agreement may be expected to increase wage dispersion, because
in the 1990s many such agreements were initiated by employers in order to
introduce new flexible pay practices.
In Spain, there was no inter-sectoral agreement at the time of the survey
(these occurred however between 1977 and 1986 and were reintroduced in
1997). Working conditions were determined either by a sectoral or a com-
pany agreement. Following the ‘no competition’ principle, the two regimes
deal with the same type of subjects and there is no division of responsibil-
ity between them (EIRO, 1997). Hence in contrast to Belgium and
Denmark, a firm covered by a company agreement is not constrained by
Plasman et al.: Wages and the Bargaining Regime under Multi-level Bargaining
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the industry agreement (though the 1997 inter-sectoral agreement
improved coordination between the different bargaining regimes).
These conditions were in place from the legalization of collective bar-
gaining in 1958. Until the death of Franco in 1975, collective bargaining was
strongly controlled by the government. Industry agreements covered most
of the workforce, but were much less respected than company agreements
which were the result of almost free collective bargaining between employ-
ers and works councils. This is why trade unions (which were illegal during
this period) attached much more importance to company bargaining, which
was also used as a tool for worker mobilization and political struggle
(Toharia, 1986). The percentage of the workforce covered by company
agreements has been fairly stable over time, signalling a certain inertia in the
structure of collective bargaining.
During the 1990s, while an expansion of single-employer agreements
occurred in many countries, in Spain there was a decrease: 15 percent
of employees were covered by a company agreement in 1990, but only
11 percent in 2001. Conversely the percentage of workers covered by
industry agreements rose from 85 to 89 percent. In fact, employers’ need
for more pay flexibility is met by a multi-employer bargaining regime
which is less binding on companies than single-employer agreements.1 For
example, since 1994 opt-out clauses have allowed firms covered by a sectoral
agreement to pay wages below industry standards in the case of economic
difficulties. Hence the existence of a company collective agreement is still
associated with greater trade union presence. According to Garcia-Serrano
and Mallo (2002: 74), more than 80 percent of collective agreements at
plant/firm level are initiated by works councils; ‘the existence of this sort
of agreement is a proxy variable for an organized action of workers’ repre-
sentatives’. Rodriguez-Gutiérez (2001) reports, for the period 1990–4, an
average union density rate of 36 percent in firms covered by a company
agreement, far above the national average of 11 percent (OECD, 2004).2
Moreover, company agreements are more often concluded in large firms
(Izquierdo et al., 2003), where unions are traditionally better organized.
To summarize, there are two mutually exclusive bargaining regimes in
Spain, with single-employer bargaining in firms with a higher union pres-
ence, while multi-employer bargaining is less binding for companies.
Therefore, the wage structure effect of the bargaining regime in Spain may
resemble that in Anglo-Saxon countries: we would expect wages to be
higher when the firm is covered by a company agreement. We would also
expect the within-firm wage dispersion to be lower. Inter-firm wage dif-
ferentials may also be lower under the company agreement regime
because of the trade union desire for standardization. Moreover, a major-
ity of industry agreements are regional or provincial. In 1995, 59 percent
of all workers covered by a collective agreement were covered by a 
local, provincial or regional industry agreement while national agreements
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(2)
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covered only 27 percent of all workers (Izqierdo et al., 2003). Large firms,
which may have establishments in different regions, are often covered by
a company agreement, which sets identical conditions for the different
regional establishments; so regional differentials may be lower under
company agreements.
Data
This study is based on the 1995 European Structure of Earnings Survey,
produced by Eurostat. This unique harmonized survey contains a wealth
of information provided by the management of establishments, both on
the firm characteristics (sector of activity, number of workers, region, form
of economic control) and on the individuals they employ (age, level of
education, paid hours, gender, occupation). It is representative of all es-
tablishments employing at least 10 workers across the economy, with the
exception of agriculture and public services.3 This dataset provides infor-
mation on the level or levels of collective agreement covering each estab-
lishment. Wage data relate to actual pay, not just negotiated rates, and
include annual bonuses. This is relevant to our study because in many
single-employer agreements, wage supplements are paid through bonuses
(13th month, profit-sharing, productivity premium). On one hand, this
conforms to the definition of wages that is currently used in the literature,
so that we can compare our results with previous findings. On the other,
we must be cautious when interpreting our results because pay levels may
be the outcome of other processes besides collective bargaining.4 We
restrict our analysis to the manufacturing sector in order to minimize this
problem, because we think that the differences between actual pay and
negotiated rates of pay are higher in most service sectors. However, this
difference may be more important for the wages observed in the industry
agreements in Spain, because of the less binding nature of those agreements
for companies.
Focusing on one sector has the additional advantage of estimating the
effects of the bargaining regime on a sample of homogeneous individuals.
Indeed, we think that these effects may differ greatly depending on the type
of firm, worker and industry agreement. Moreover, manufacturing is the
key bargaining sector in Denmark, setting the benchmark for agreements in
other sectors (Andersen and Mailand, 2005). We also exclude workers who
are not covered by any agreement, as well as by those that cannot be classi-
fied as single or multi-employer agreements (for instance, an industry may
contain a single firm). Finally, we exclude workers belonging to a category
(occupation or industry) not present in one of the two regimes within a
country. In total, this corresponds to a reduction of seven, six and two
percent respectively for the Belgian, Danish and Spanish samples.5
Plasman et al.: Wages and the Bargaining Regime under Multi-level Bargaining
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Several interesting points may be highlighted in the analysis of the
dataset. In all three countries, wages are on average significantly higher
under single-employer agreements. The standard deviation of log wages is
smaller under single-employer than under multi-employer agreements in
Spain. The opposite result is found for Denmark. No significant difference
in standard deviation can be seen for Belgium. Seniority in the company is
on average six years greater under company agreements than under indus-
try agreements in Spain, while the difference in seniority between the two
regimes is much smaller in Belgium (three years) and Denmark (less than
one year). This is in line with Garcia-Serrano and Malo (2002), who found
that firms with company agreements in Spain had significantly lower
turnover than firms under industry agreement. They interpreted this result
as a consequence of a ‘voice effect’: when workers, by means of works
councils or union delegations, can express their grievances or demands,
they quit less frequently and job tenure is longer.
There is a large difference in job security between the two regimes in
Spain: 10 percent of workers under company agreements are employed
on fixed-term contracts, as against 26 percent of those under industry
agreements. In Belgium and Denmark, the proportion employed on fixed
term contracts does not exceed three percent in either regime. The num-
ber of employees is, on average, significantly larger in firms that sign
their own collective agreement in all three countries, perhaps because
workers are generally better organized in large firms. Finally, we see that
firms in Belgium and Spain are more often publicly owned when there is
a single-employer agreement. According to Dominguez and Rodriguez-
Gutiérez (2004), the proportion of trade union members is greater when
the firm is publicly owned in Spain. In our sample, all firms in both
regimes are privately owned in Denmark.
Estimation
Estimation Procedure
A comparison of simple statistics, as in the previous section, does not ad-
equately measure the effect of the bargaining regime on wage structure.
Indeed, differences in characteristics between the two regimes may bias
results. Therefore, in order to estimate the ‘pure’ effect of the bargaining
regime, we must control for the differences in characteristics, using a more
complex estimation procedure. In the remainder of this section we present
a non-technical explanation of our estimation procedure. The equations
are given in the technical appendix.
The bargaining regime has an effect on the wage structure because
there are differences in the monetary return of firms’ and workers’ char-
acteristics between the two regimes. For example, industry wage rates are
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generally independent of the size of the firm. On the other hand, many
studies have shown there to be a correlation between actual wages and
company size. Hence, there would be larger wage differentials between
firms of different sizes (in economic terms: a higher return to firm size)
among those covered by a single-employer agreement than among those
that pay the sectoral rate. This will affect the wage structure: larger wage
differentials between firms contribute to a larger dispersion of wages.
Therefore, we base our measurements of the wage structure effects of
the bargaining regime on the differences in returns to firms’ and workers’
characteristics between the two regimes. We estimate separate wage equa-
tions by bargaining regime in order to obtain estimates of the returns of
several characteristics for each. Those characteristics are: seniority (in
years), potential experience (years since completing education), level of
education (in years), gender, types of employment contract (fixed/unlim-
ited, full/part-time), whether a worker supervises the work of co-workers,
shift, night or weekend working, overtime working, occupation (ISCO
two-digit category), firm size (number of employees in the establishment),
form of financial control (private, semi-private, public), region of the
establishment and industry affiliation (NACE rev.1, two-digit category).
Those estimates are used to compute an estimation of:
● the difference in average wages between the two regimes;
● the difference in the standard deviation of wages between the two
regimes;
● the difference in inter-decile (90–10, 90–50 and 50–10) wage differen-
tials between the two regimes.
Wage Equations
We begin by analysing the results of the wage equations estimated sep-
arately for workers covered by single-employer and by multi-employer
bargaining. The large R2 indicates that the variables used in the estima-
tion explain the determination of wages to a great extent, and the signs of
the coefficients are in line with theoretical expectations.
More interesting are the differences in coefficients between the two
regimes. Among human capital variables, only the return to potential ex-
perience exhibits no significant difference between the two regimes for any
of the three countries. The return to seniority is smaller under single-
employer agreements in Belgium and Spain (by respectively 0.2 and 0.4 per-
cent). But it is larger by 0.8 percent under single-employer agreements in
Denmark. This is in line with the study by Bingley and Westergaard-
Nielsen (2003), who found that the return to tenure has increased since bar-
gaining decentralization began in the 1990s. Their explanation is that tenure
was very low in Denmark, compared to the other OECD countries.6
Employers have taken the opportunity afforded by a more decentralized
Plasman et al.: Wages and the Bargaining Regime under Multi-level Bargaining
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system to raise the return to tenure in order to increase the attachment of
workers to their firms. Decentralized bargaining seems to reward better
human capital characteristics in Belgium and Denmark, as shown by the dif-
ference in the coefficient of years of education. The difference is not statistic-
ally significant in Spain. The wage penalty for female workers is smaller (by
two percent) under single-employer agreements in Spain, where the gender
wage gap under multi-employer bargaining is very wide (20 percent, com-
pared to 16 percent in Belgium and nine percent in Denmark), so unions
may want to close this gap through single employer agreement. Single-
employer agreements increase the gender wage gap in Denmark (by one
percent), but the gap under this regime is still lower than in the two other
countries. The difference is not statistically significant in Belgium.
An analysis of the effects of the bargaining regimes on wage differen-
tials between occupations reveals interesting results. The occupation of
reference is ‘machine operators and assemblers’, the largest blue-collar
group. In Denmark, 12 occupations increase their position relative to the
reference when there is a single-employer agreement in addition to the
sectoral agreement. Most of these are white-collar, and eight were already
better paid than the reference when only a multi-employer agreement was
in place. Conversely, two of the three occupational groups whose pos-
itions worsened under a single-employer agreement are blue-collar. Hence
it seems that, in Denmark, single-employer agreements widen the inter-
occupation wage differentials and mostly benefit white-collar workers. In
Spain, by contrast, single-employer agreements seem to reduce the differ-
entials between occupations: the three groups that have a better position
under single-employer agreements are paid less than or equal to the refer-
ence under multi-employer agreements. Conversely, the four groups that
have a worse position under single-employer agreements are better paid
than the reference under multi-employer agreements; three of these are
white-collar. This may be explained by trade union efforts in company bar-
gaining to increase the relative wages of their members who are traditionally
low-paid and unskilled. Surprisingly, it seems that in Belgium also, single-
employer agreements reduce wage differentials between occupations. Five
out of the six groups that have improved their position by being covered
by a single-employer agreement in addition to the sectoral agreement were
paid less than the reference under multi-employer agreements. The oppo-
site is true for the two groups that have worsened their position.
The return to firm size is larger under single-employer agreements in
Belgium and in Denmark. This indicates for those two countries that
firm-specific characteristics (at least size) are better taken into account
under single-employer agreements. The fact that the reverse is found in
Spain may be a sign of the union policy of wage standardization between
firms. Finally, we observe that in Spain, the wage penalty relative to the
reference region ‘East’ is larger under multi-employer agreements than
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under single-employer agreements in four regions. The difference is not
statistically significant for the two other regions. So regional wage differ-
entials seem to be larger under multi-employer than under single-
employer agreements in Spain. This may be explained by the fact that
multi-employer agreements are often regional or provincial, while single-
employer agreements may cover large firms that have establishments in
different regions, thus setting the same wages for the different regional
establishments.
Effect of the Bargaining Regime on Wage Levels
Table 1 shows that wages are on average higher under single-employer
agreements, even if we control for differences in observed characteristics.
The wage differentials are around four percent without statistically signifi-
cant differences between the countries. This result is not surprising for
Belgium and Denmark because single-employer agreements can only
increase the wages set at higher levels. It is in the range of previous findings
for multi-level bargaining systems: 4.4 and 7.5 percent respectively for blue-
and white-collar workers in Italy (Dell’Aringa and Lucifora, 1994a), 
0.5 percent in the Netherlands (Hartog et al., 2002), 5.1 percent in Belgium
(Rycx, 2003) and 1.6 percent in Portugal (Cardoso and Portugal, 2003). 
In Spain, because company agreements are not constrained by sectoral
agreements, this result may be due to stronger union bargaining power in
companies covered by a company agreement. It is line with the wage dif-
ferential of five percent found by Palenzuela and Jimeno (1996).
Effect of the Bargaining Regime on Wage Dispersion
Our estimations show (Table 2) that, other things being equal, single-
employer agreements increase the standard deviation of wages in
Denmark by 0.022 relative to multi-employer agreements. In Belgium,
single-employer agreements increase the standard deviation by 0.004. In
Spain, by contrast, the standard deviation is smaller by 0.027 under single-
employer agreements. Similar results are found when we analyse the
Plasman et al.: Wages and the Bargaining Regime under Multi-level Bargaining
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TABLE 1. Average Log Wage Differential between Single-employer
and Multi-Employer Agreements (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Belgium Denmark Spain
0.041*** 0.031*** 0.041***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
* p0.10; **p0.05; *** p0.001.
Source: ESES 1995.
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effect of the bargaining regime on the 90–10 percentile wage differential.
Controlling for differences in characteristics, single-employer agree-
ments increase this differential by 0.022 and 0.083 respectively in
Belgium and in Denmark, but reduce it by 0.077 in Spain. The compari-
son of the effect of the bargaining regime on the 50–10 and on the 90–50
percentile differentials shows that, in Denmark, this effect is similar
(0.042) in the lower and in the upper parts of the wage distribution. In
Belgium, the increase in wage dispersion is only due to an increase (0.023)
in the upper half of the wage distribution. Company agreements in fact
very slightly reduce (by 0.001) the wage dispersion in the lower half. In
Spain, almost all the reduction in wage dispersion takes place in the lower
half of the wage distribution (0.071 in the lower part and 0.005 in the
upper part). This may mean that the wage gains from coverage by a
single-employer agreement benefit most particularly the workers whose
wages are below the median, which, again, may be attributed to trade
union policy.
To sum up, single-employer agreements, as compared with multi-
employer agreements, increase wage dispersion in Denmark and Belgium
and reduce it in Spain. The effects are very small in Belgium. In relative
terms, single-employer agreements increase the standard deviation of
wages by one percent and the 90–10 percentile wage differential by three
percent. The effects are greater in Denmark and in Spain. In the former,
single-employer agreements increase the standard deviation by seven per-
cent and the 90–10 percentile differential by 12 percent. In the latter, single-
employer agreements reduce the standard deviation by six percent and the
90–10 percentile differential by seven percent. The more limited effects in
Belgium may be due to the fact that opposing forces cancel each other out.
Firm size and education, for instance, have higher returns under company
agreements, while the opposite occurs for tenure and occupation. Another
explanation is strict government control over wage-setting since 1981, lim-
iting wage cost increases. The automatic indexation of wages and multi-
employer wage increases already account for a substantial part of the
authorized wage increase (from 1983 to 1986, no other increases were
authorized). So the small difference in wage dispersion between single- and
multi-employer agreements can be explained by the fact that Belgian firms
have little freedom for their wage policies.
Conclusion
This article has examined the effect of the bargaining regime on the wage
structure in Belgium, Denmark and Spain, using a harmonized matched
employer–employee dataset. In all three countries most workers, irrespect-
ive of their union status, are covered by a multi-employer agreement.
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In Belgium and Denmark, multi-employer agreements set industry or
national standards for specified categories of workers that are defined on
the basis of a limited number of criteria such age, experience and occupa-
tion. Bargaining at company level may then increase wages above the sect-
oral standard. Our estimations show that in both countries, both the level
and the dispersion of wages are higher for workers covered by single-
employer agreements, compared to workers covered only by multi-
employer agreements. This reflects the fact that single-employer agreements
cannot set lower wages than agreements at the higher level. The increase in
wage dispersion may come from two sources. First, company agreements
may increase inter-firm wage differentials because they take into account
firm specificities which are not among the criteria that define multi-
employer standards. The comparison of wage equation coefficients between
the two regimes does indeed show that firm size has a greater effect on
wages under single-employer agreements. For Belgium, our results are in
line with Rycx (2003), who finds a larger dispersion of inter-industry wage
differentials for firms covered by a company agreement. Second, a company
agreement may increase the within-firm wage dispersion, because many
single-employer agreements signed since the decentralization trend in the
1990s have been initiated by employers in order to introduce more pay
flexibility and wider differentials in their firms. From the comparison of
wage equation estimates, we find larger differentials between workers with
a different tenure, education level, occupation and gender under single-
employer agreements in Denmark. This may be linked to the generalized
practice of ‘pay-sum’ bargaining, where only the aggregate increase at
firm-level is determined by collective bargaining and its allocation among
workers is left to the employer. For Belgium, the effect on the within-firm
dispersion is uncertain: although single-employer agreements increase the
return to education, they also reduce the return to tenure and the wage dif-
ferentials between occupations.
In Spain, single-employer agreements constitute a bargaining regime
independent of industry agreements. Following the ‘no competition’ prin-
ciple, the two regimes deal with the same types of subject and there is no
division of responsibility between them. Therefore, single-employer agree-
ments may set wages above or below industry standards. By contrast with
Belgium and Denmark where many company agreements are initiated by
the employer, the majority of single-employer agreements in Spain are ini-
tiated by works councils or trade union delegations: average union density
in firms covered by a single-employer agreement is much greater than in
firms covered by an industry agreement. Multi-employer agreements are
also less binding on companies than single-employer agreements.
Therefore, the differences in wage structure between the two bargaining
regimes resemble the differences between the union and non-union sectors
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(2)
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in Anglo-Saxon countries. Higher wages and lower wage dispersion are
found under company bargaining. The lower wage dispersion seems to
result from a reduction in the wage dispersion both within and between
firms. Comparison of wage equation coefficients between the two regimes
indeed shows lower wage differentials between occupations, gender, tenure
and firm size under the firm agreement regime. The regional dimension of
collective bargaining may constitute a complementary explanation to this
compression effect. Industry agreements have, on the whole, local (regional
or provincial) scope in Spain, while a company agreement may apply to
establishments in different regions or provinces. We do indeed observe that
the regional coefficients in the firm agreement wage equation are lower
than in the industry agreement wage equation. Our results confirm and
complete the findings of Dominguez and Rodriguez-Gutiérez (2004) who
find that company agreements compress the within-firm wage dispersion
in Spain.
We conclude that single-employer agreements are mainly used in
Denmark and Belgium to adapt pay to the specificities of the firm and to
local economic conditions. In Spain, they are mainly used by unions to
raise wages and to compress the wage distribution. Note that this does not
imply that, in Spain, the industry wage rates are more dispersed than the
wages set by single-employer agreements. It may be that, because of the
less binding nature of sectoral agreements, firms covered by these have
more freedom to set wages and, because unions are weak in these firms,
can impose a very dispersed wage structure. It would be interesting to see
if results would be different with data on negotiated rates of pay rather
than actual pay.
Future research concerning the effect of the bargaining regime on the
wage structure should control for a potential selectivity effect, that is, for
the fact that firms or workers in a particular bargaining regime might not
be representative of the overall sample. However, as pointed out by
Hartog et al. (1997: 7), this will remain a very difficult task ‘as long as no
(satisfactory) independent variables to control for the endogeneity of the
bargaining regime are available’.
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NOTES
1 We thank an anonymous referee for this information.
2 This implies that average union density in firms covered by an industry
agreement is only seven percent.
3 It includes all economic activities falling within NACE Rev. 1 categories 
C to K.
4 We thank one of the referees for highlighting this problem.
5 Complete descriptive statistics and wage equations are available in 
Plasman et al. (2006).
6 With an average tenure of 7.9 years, Denmark is on a level with the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. It is also among the countries with the lowest
fraction of those with more than 10 years of tenure (Bingley and
Westergaard-Nielsen, 2003).
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Wage Equations by Bargaining Regime
lnWi
SE Xi
SE SE  ei
SE (1)
lnWi
ME  Xi
ME SE  ei
ME (2)
Wi is the wage of the ith worker in each bargaining regime (single-employer bar-
gaining (SE) and multi-employer bargaining (ME)). X is a vector of worker, firm
and job characteristics.  is the vector of the coefficients (i.e. the returns of the
characteristics) to be estimated and ei is the error term. Those wage equations are
estimated by ordinary least squares with White (1980) heteroscedasticity consist-
ent standard errors.
Difference in Mean Wages between the Two Regimes
(3)
X

SE and XME are the vectors of mean characteristics respectively across the SE and
the ME workers. The first component on the right-hand side of the equation is
the difference in mean wages that is due to differences in observed characteristics
between the two regimes. The second component is the difference in mean wages
that is due to differences in the wage equations coefficients between the two
regimes. Following Stewart (1987), we consider this last component as the effect
of the bargaining regime on average wages. Said differently, it measures the impact
on the average wage of the differences in the returns of observed firms’ and work-
ers’ characteristics between the two regimes. Standard errors from Stewart (1987)
are used for the statistical inferences.
Difference in Wage Dispersion between the Two Regimes
In order to estimate the effect of the bargaining regime on the wage dispersion,
we use the method of Juhn et al. (1993). This method consists in constructing
wage counterfactuals for each individual, and then computing distributional
lnWi
SE  lnWi
ME  ˆ ME'(XSE XME)  XSE '(ˆSE  ˆME)
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statistics from the counterfactual wage distributions obtained. First, we must
express equations (1) and (2) in the following forms:
lnWi
SE  Xi
SESE  FSE
1 ( i
SE ) (4)
lnWi
ME  Xi
MEME  FME
1 ( i
ME ) (5)
where FSE
1( i
SE )ei
SE and FME
1 ( i
ME)ei
ME; FSE
1 and FME
1 are the inverse of the
cumulative distribution of the residuals respectively in the SE and in the ME
sample; i is the rank of the residual of the i
th individual in the residual distribu-
tion. Then, we construct two types of counterfactual wages for each SE worker:
ln Wi
SE(1)  Xi
SEME  FSE
1 (i
SE ) (6)
ln Wi
SE(2)  Xi
SEME  FME
1 (i
SE ) (7)
ln Wi
SE(1) is the log wage of the SE workers if they were remunerated like the ME
workers and is obtained by using the coefficients from the earnings equation esti-
mated in ME sample; ln Wi
SE(2) is the log wage of the SE workers if, in addition,
their residuals were distributed as for the ME workers. Once we have these four
log wage distributions (ln WME; ln WME; ln WSE(1); ln WSE(2)), we can construct dis-
tributional statistics for each of them. Consider the statistics G (e.g. G  standard
deviation, P90-P10, P50-P10 or P90-P50). The difference in G between SE and
ME may be decomposed into three components:
G(ln WSE) G(ln WME)  G(ln WSE(2))  G(ln WME)
 G(ln WSE)  G(ln WSE(1))
 G(ln WSE(1))  G(ln WSE(2)) (8)
The first component on the right-hand side of the equation is the difference in G
due to differences in observed and unobserved characteristics (it corresponds to
row 4 in table 2); the second is the difference in G due to differences in wage equa-
tion coefficients, i.e. the difference in the returns of the observed characteristics
(row 5); the third is the difference in G due to differences in the returns of unob-
served characteristics (row 6). We define the effect of the bargaining regime on G
as the sum of the two last components, so the difference in G that is due to dif-
ferences in the returns of observed and unobserved characteristics (row 7). We
estimate the effect of the bargaining regime on the standard deviation, the 90–10,
the 90–50 and the 50–10 percentile differentials.
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